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The last few decades have seen a spectacular integration of the global economy through
trade.  The rising integration of world markets has brought with it a disintegration of the
production process, however, as manufacturing or services activities done abroad are combined
with those performed at home.  I compare several different measures of foreign outsourcing, and
argue that they have all increased since the 1970s.  I also consider the implications of
globalization for employment and wages of low-skilled workers, and for trade and regulatory
policy, such as labor standards.2
The last few decades have seen a spectacular integration of the global economy through trade. 
The share of imports (or exports) in GDP for the United States has approximately doubled in the last
two decades, and if intra-OECD trade is omitted, the same is true for the OECD countries generally.
Trade does remain a seemingly small fraction of U.S. GDP. This is not surprising in view of the fact
that large economies trade less with others, and more internally.  But the modest share of trade in total
national income hides the fact that merchandise trade as a share of merchandise value-added is quite
high for the U.S. and the OECD, and has been growing dramatically.  In fact, if one focuses on
merchandise trade relative to value-added, the world is much more integrated today than at any time
during the past century.  
The rising integration of world markets has brought with it a disintegration of the production
process, in which manufacturing or services activities done abroad are combined with those performed
at home. Companies are now finding it profitable to outsource increasing amounts of the production
process, a process which can happen either domestically or abroad. This represents a breakdown in the
vertically-integrated mode of production – the so-called “Fordist” production, exemplified by the
automobile industry – on which American manufacturing was built.  A number of prominent
researchers have referred to the importance of the idea that production occurs internationally:
Bhagwati and Dehejia (1994) call this “kaleidoscope comparative advantage,” as firms shift location
quickly; Krugman (1996) uses the phrase “slicing the value chain”; Leamer (1996) prefers
“delocalization;” while Antweiler and Trefler (1997) introduce “intra-mediate trade.”  There is no
single measure that captures the full range of these activities, but I shall compare several different
measures of foreign outsourcing, and argue that they have all
increased since the 1970s.3
I then consider the implications of globalization.  Of principal interest is the impact on
employment and wages of low-skilled workers.  Although this topic has already received much
discussion and review,
 1 I believe that the fundamental importance of outsourcing is still not
recognized.  The debate is sometimes framed as evaluating “trade” versus “technology” as
alternative explanations for the falling real income of low-skilled workers.  In fact, I will argue
that by allowing for trade in intermediate inputs, globalization has an impact on employment and
wages that are observationally equivalent to the changes induced by technological innovation. 
The idea that globalization has a minor impact on wages relies on a conceptual model that allows only
trade in final goods, thereby downplaying or ignoring the outsourcing of production activities.  The
empirical evidence supports a much more prominent role for the optimal decisions of firms to
allocate production worldwide, that needs to be incorporated into our theoretical framework.
I also consider the implications of the disintegration of the production process for trade and
regulatory policy, including labor standards.  Only a few years ago business was calling for a “level
playing field,” but that cry is seldom heard now: the playing field has been leveled, at least for
manufacturing firms, through rapid capital mobility.  Any corporation that would like to take advantage
of regulatory or trade policies in a foreign country can simply move or sub-contract through a firm
located there.  Rather than a “level playing field” for business, the policy issue now is international
“harmonization” of regulations that affect labor and also the environment (Bhagwati and Hudec, 1997).
 An example is the Labor Side Agreement negotiated under the North American Free Trade
Agreement, which I discuss.  Policies such as this are a logical consequence of the
                                               
1. For discussion of the links between trade and wages in this journal, see the articles in the symposia
on “Income Inequality and Trade” in the Summer 1995 issue of this journal, and in the symposium on4
fundamental changes in the global economy, whereby companies spread their production activities
worldwide, and will set the stage for trade negotiations in the years to come.
Integration of Trade
The decades leading up to 1913 were a golden age of trade and investment worldwide. This
was ended by World War I and the Great Depression, and it took many years to regain the same level
of global integration.  For most of the industrial countries shown in Table 1, the level of merchandise
trade relative to GDP prevailing in 1913 was not obtained again until the late 1960s or 1970s, and
some countries – like Australia, Denmark, Japan and the United Kingdom – still have not reached the
earlier level. Krugman (1995, p. 331) uses numbers like these to conclude that  “ ... it would be hard to
argue that the sheer volume of trade is now at a level that marks a qualitative difference from previous
experience.”
But the figures in Table 1 do not tell the whole story.  The comparisons there are for industrial
countries, that have had increasing shares of their economies devoted to services rather than
“merchandise” trade like manufacturing, mining and agriculture.  The rising share of services is usually
explained by two factors: services are a luxury good, whose share rises with per capita income; and
services have slower productivity growth than manufacturing, so that the relative price of services is
increasing, and with an elasticity of substitution between services and other goods of less than unity,
this implies faster growth of the service sector. To these explanations we can add a third possibility,
advanced by Rodrik (1996): as the openness of an economy increases, so do government expenditures,
needed in part to offset the external risks from trade.  For all these reasons, the merchandise
component of GDP is shrinking, so that merchandise trade relative to GDP is pulled down for this5
reason.
To offer a different perspective, we measure merchandise trade relative to merchandise value-
added, as Irwin (1996) does for the United States.  Information of this type for various industrial
countries is contained in Table 2.  There are still two countries for which the ratio of merchandise trade
to industry value-added was larger in 1913 than in 1990 (Japan and the United Kingdom) and one
other for which this ratio changed little (Australia).  But all the other countries have experienced
substantial growth in trade relative to industry value-added since 1913: this ratio has increased by about
one-third for Denmark and Norway and by three-quarters for Canada; has doubled for France,
Germany, Italy, and Sweden; and has nearly tripled for the United States.  Merchandise trade has
indeed grown substantially relative to the production of these commodities in many countries.
What factors account for the growth in trade demonstrated in Table 2?  Two possibilities that
come to mind immediately are trade liberalization, and falling transportation costs.  Estimates of their
impact on bilateral trade of the OECD countries are provided by Baier and Bergstrand (1997) (see also
Rose, 1991).  The average level of bilateral trade grew twice as fast as country GDP in their sample,
over 1958-1988.  About two-fifths of the growth of trade relative to income is explained by the
combined effect of falling tariffs and transport costs.  Of these, falling tariffs were twice as important as
falling transportation costs.  Nevertheless, both are only partial explanations, leaving three-fifths of the
growth in trade relative to income unexplained.
Another explanation for the growth in trade is that when economies become more similar in
size, world trade increases, as demonstrated theoretically by Helpman (1987).  Consider a world with
three countries and a GDP of 120. If the three countries have GDP of 100, 10 and 10, respectively,
then the maximum level of exports in this world is 40, when the small countries export all of GDP and6
receive imports of an equal amount. However, if the three countries have GDP of 40 each, then the
maximum level of exports in this world is 120.  Thus, when countries become more similar in size, they
import more product varieties from each other.  This hypothesis has found considerable empirical
support for the OECD and also non-OECD countries (Hummels and Levinsohn, 1995).
A final explanation, of particular relevance to this paper, is that the disintegration of production
itself leads to more trade, as intermediate inputs cross borders several times during the manufacturing
process.  This leads to an upward bias in the ratios reported in Table 2, because while the
denominator is value-added, the numerator is not, and will “double-count” trade in components
and the finished product (e.g. automobile parts and finished autos are both included in trade
between the United States and Canada).  This is surely an important factor in the great surge in
exports from the Asian newly-industrialized countries.  As their economies have expanded, these
countries have become producers of a vast array of consumer and industrial products, relying
substantially on imported intermediate inputs.  In some cases, these goods are marketed under the
brand name of the company itself (such as Hyundai or Samsung, from Korea).  But the majority of
these goods have been purchased by companies in the importing country, and then marketed under
their own brand names.  This phenomenon under which foreign companies are engaged in “original
equipment manufacturing” which is then resold under corporate brandnames in the west is a
phenomena that took off during the 1980s.  This is part of the “outsourcing” phenomenon, and in the
next section I attempt to demonstrate its growth in recent years.
Disintegration of Production
As an example of outsourcing, consider the Barbie doll (Tempest, 1996).  The raw materials7
for the doll (plastic and hair) are obtained from Taiwan and Japan.  Assembly used to be done in those
countries, as well as the Philippines,  but it has now migrated to lower-cost locations in Indonesia,
Malaysia, and China.  The molds themselves come from the United States, as do additional paints used
in decorating the dolls.  Other than labor, China supplies only the cotton cloth used for dresses.  Of the
$2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United States, about 35 cents covers
Chinese labor, 65 cents covers the cost of materials, and the remainder covers transportation and
overhead, including profits earned in Hong Kong.  The dolls sell for about $10 in the United States, of
which Mattel earns at least $1, and the rest covers transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing
in the U.S.  The majority of value-added is therefore from U.S. activity.  The dolls sell worldwide at the
rate of two dolls every second, and this product alone accounted for $1.4 billion in sales for Mattel in
1995.
Another well-known example is Nike (Tisdale, 1994).  About 75,000 people are employed in
Asia in the production of shoes and clothing for Nike, though only a few hundred of these are actually
employees of the company.  The rest are employed in factories that have some contractual arrangement
with Nike, possibly run by third parties, such as South Korean entrepreneurs.  Along with this massive,
albeit indirect, workforce in Asia, Nike has some 2,500 employees in the United States.  The
worldwide sales of Nike shoes generated profits of $360 million in 1993.
In what sense are these activities by Mattel and Nike different from the purchase of any other
foreign toy or shoe by a American resident?  The answer is that the outsourcing activities by these
corporations support a very large U.S. presence: both Mattel and Nike do the design and marketing of
their products in the United States.  The activities outsourced by these corporations is part of their
larger “value chain,” which include all the activities from the conception of a product to its final8
delivery.  It should be stressed at this point that these activities need not be internal to a firm, and as a
result, looking within multinational firms alone does not give full perspective on what is happening. For
example, Lawrence (1994) focuses on the imports of U.S. multinationals as one measure of
outsourcing, and argues that changes in these imports are too small to be a cause of domestic wage and
employment changes.  Similarly, Krugman (1994) argues that flows of foreign direct investment
through multinational firms are too small to account for observed wages and employment changes.
2  In
contrast, I will adopt a general definition of outsourcing that, in addition to imports specifically by U.S.
multinationals, includes all imported intermediate or final goods that are used in the production of an
American firm, or sold under its brand name.
The question then becomes how to construct a data series that reflects the full range of
industries and activities included within “outsourcing.”  Several different approaches can shed light on
this phenomena.  A starting point is to examine what has happened to the composition of U.S. trade
using the “end-use” categories of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (as suggested by Irwin, 1996). 
Rather than assigning goods by their production process, these categories assign them according to
their use by purchasers.  The bulk of trade occurs in the five categories shown in Table 3: food, feeds
and beverages; industrial supplies and materials; capital goods (except autos); consumer goods (except
autos); and automotive vehicles and parts.
3 
The table shows U.S. trade shifting away from agriculture and raw materials, and towards
manufactured goods in U.S. trade, as seen from the declining shares of foods, feeds and beverages, and
                                               
2. The use of U.S. multinational data to measure outsourcing also limits the generality of the results in 
Slaughter (1995), Brainard and Riker (1997) and Riker and Brainard (1997).
3. I omit petroleum products, which are distinguished separately for imports since 1967, and also
“other” imports and exports, which include low-valued items, re-exports, certain military and other
items.9
industrial supplies and materials.  Together, these categories accounted for over 90 percent of imports
in 1925 and 1950, and less than 25 percent in 1990; the export share fell from about 80 percent to 35
percent over that time.  The industrial supplies and materials should be thought of as mainly raw
materials, with some basic manufactured goods such as steel, newsprint, textile yarns, and so on. 
Much more processing is done on the capital and consumer goods.  The capital goods are used by
firms for both investment (like machinery) but also are used as intermediate inputs.  For example, all
electrical parts and components, except finished consumer products, are included within capital goods.
 The consumer goods consist of finished household products, but there is still value-added on these
goods in the United States, such as for advertising, marketing, and product development.
The share of capital plus consumer goods together have increased from 10 percent in imports
and 15 percent in exports in 1925, to over 50 percent in 1990.  Even in recent years, there has been a
very substantial growth in imports of capital goods (including intermediate inputs), with the share
increasing by more than half during the 1980s.  These trends indicate that processed manufactured
goods play an increasingly important role in U.S. trade.  While some of these goods are sold directly to
U.S. consumers, in many cases there will be additional value-added by American firms.  Outsourcing
takes on greatest significance when the products being imported are neither basic raw materials, nor
finished consumer goods, but are at an intermediate stage of processing.  In that case, it is very
plausible that stages of the production process (or value chain) shift across borders as new trade
opportunities emerge. 
The data presented in Table 3 indicate that products are being imported into the United States
at increasingly advanced stages of processing, which suggests that U.S. firms may have been
substituting away from these processing activities at home.  To confirm this hypothesis, we need to10
obtain more direct evidence on outsourcing. One source of information is to identify the purchaser of
the imports, and use this to draw inferences about the value-added on to the imports that occurs in the
United States.  The identity of importers and exporters is collected by the U.S. Customs Service, but
this information is kept confidential.  However, the Customs Service has published one study
concerning the top 100 apparel importers, who collectively account for one-quarter of all apparel
imports in 1993.  Retailers such as JC Penney, Wal-Mart, The Limited, Kmart and Sears accounted for
48 percent of the value of these imports; another 22 percent went to U.S. apparel designers such as Liz
Claiborne, Donna Karan, Calvin Klein and Ralph Lauren; while domestic producers make up an
additional 20 percent of the total (Jones, 1995, pp. 25-26; Gereffi, 1998).  Both apparel designers and
domestic producers, together comprising 42 percent of the imports, are engaged in design and
marketing functions.  Large retailers are increasingly taking on this activity, as well.  Only traditional
wholesalers and traders – which make up the remaining 10 percent of these imports – are substantially
divorced from the design and production process.  
These numbers attest to the extensive outsourcing activities by U.S. apparel companies, and a
similar description of buyers applies to European apparel imports (Gereffi, 1998).  Within the footwear
industry, too, 30 percent of all footwear imports in the United States in 1984 were purchased by
manufacturers of shoes, who often market the products under the same brand name used to sell their
U.S.-made footwear (Yoffie and Gomes-Casseres, 1994, p. 111).  Many of these companies used
imports as a means to shift the lowest-cost parts of the production process overseas.  Such a trend can
be seen for the textile, apparel and footwear industries taken together in Table 4, where we report the
ratio of imported to domestic inputs for various OECD countries.  These ratios show an increase for all
countries from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s, and it can be expected that this trend has continued or11
accelerated since then. 
Table 4 illustrates how outsourcing can be measured by imported intermediate inputs within
each industry.  Some countries collect this information in the process of constructing input-output
tables, although the United States does not.  Nevertheless, imported intermediate inputs can be
estimated for each U.S. industry by using the purchases of each type of input, and multiplying this by
the economy-wide import share for that input.  Summing this over all inputs used within each industry,
we obtain estimated imported inputs, which can then be expressed relative to total intermediate input
purchases.  Feenstra and Hanson (1997) perform this calculation for U.S. manufacturing industries, and
find that imported inputs have increased from 5.7 percent of total intermediate purchases in 1972 to 8.6
percent in 1979, and 13.9 percent in 1990.
Campa and Goldberg (1997) make the same calculation for Canada, Japan, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and their results for selected industries are shown in Table 5. The
United States shows a doubling of the share of imported inputs between 1975 and 1995 for all
manufacturing, though it is still at a low level compared to Canada and the United Kingdom, where
over 20 percent of inputs were purchased from abroad in 1993.  The United Kingdom shows an
especially large absolute increase in foreign outsourcing.  The upward trend for overall manufacturing
is also displayed in the individual industries.  The chemical industry has a lower share of imported
inputs than overall, whereas machinery (non-electric and electric) and transportation equipment have
higher shares in these three countries.  The machinery and transportation industries have especially
rapid growth in imported inputs, with many of the share doubling or even tripling between 1974 and
1993.  The exception to these observations is Japan, where the share of imports in these heavy
industries is lower than in overall manufacturing, and has generally been falling.12
Imported intermediate inputs have also been computed for nine OECD countries by Hummels,
Rapoport and Yi (1997), who use the term “vertical specialization” to describe the specialization of a
country in particular segments of the value chain.
4  When inputs are imported, then processed, and the
resulting product is exported, the total value of exports reflects more than just the value-added in that
country.  Their measure of vertical specialization equals the fraction of the total value of trade
accounted for by inputs that are both imported and then embodied in exports.
5  This measure lies
between zero, when imported inputs are not used in the production of exports, and unity, when all
imports are re-exported, with minimal value-added.
Their findings show a rise in the values of vertical specialization for a number of countries
between about 1970 and 1990: the U.S. value rises from 3.9 percent to 7.4 percent over those two
decades; the United Kingdom, 14.3 percent to 19.1 percent; and France, 13.9 percent to 18.7 percent. 
Japan is a notable exception to the general trend, where the degree of vertical specialization drops from
7.3 percent in 1970 to 6.6 percent in 1990. The extent of vertical specialization varies a good deal
across countries, being higher than 30 percent for the Netherlands; higher than 20 percent for Canada
and Denmark; and between 10 and 20 percent for Germany, France and the United Kingdom.  As for
explaining the growth in exports for each country, Hummels, Rapoport and Yi (1997) find that nearly
one-half of this growth is due to vertical specialization-based trade in Canada and the Netherlands;
between one-quarter and one-third for France, Denmark and the U.K.; and smaller amounts for the
                                               
4. Arndt (1997, 1998a,b) uses “intra-product specialization” to describe the same phenomena.
5. On the import side, the imported intermediates that are used in the production of exports are
measured by the product of imported intermediates and the fraction of gross production that is
exported.  On the export side, the factor-content of exports coming from imported intermediates is
measured by the product of exports and the fraction of gross production that is imported intermediates.
 Vertical-specialization in trade equals the sum of these two terms, but since they are equal in value, it
is equivalently measured as twice the value of either one.13
U.S., Australia and Japan.
By a variety of measures, the increased use of imported inputs, and narrowing of production
activities within each country, is a characteristic feature of many OECD countries over the past two
decades.
Implications for Inequality of Wages
The decision of companies to source their production overseas will most certainly impact the
employment of such firms at home, and can be expected to have different effects on skilled and
unskilled workers.  With firms in developed countries facing a higher relative wage for unskilled labor
than that found abroad, the activities that are outsourced will be those that use a large amount of
unskilled labor, such as assembly of components and other repetitive tasks.  Moving these activities
overseas will reduce the relative demand for unskilled labor in the developed country, in much the same
way as replacing these workers with automated production.  This means that outsourcing has a
qualitatively similar effect on reducing the demand for unskilled relative to skilled labor within an
industry as does skill-biased technological change.
This insight has several important implications.  First, we should not assess the proximate cause
of the decline in employment and wages of unskilled workers by attributing all within-industry shifts in
labor demand to technology, and allowing trade to operate only via between-industry shifts.  This was
the approach taken by Lawrence and Slaughter (1993) and Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), both
of whom considered only trade in final goods.  In that context, it is correct that international trade must
affect labor demand through inter-industry shifts.  But as soon as trade in intermediate inputs is
permitted, as with outsourcing, then changes in the demand for labor within each industry can occur14
due to trade, as well.
In fact, the whole distinction between “trade” versus “technology” becomes suspect when we
think of corporations shifting activities overseas.  The increase in outsourcing activity during the 1980s
was in part related to improvements in communication technology and the speed with which product
quality and design can be monitored, which was in turn related to the use of computers.  A good
example of this is the “retailing revolution” that has occurred during the 1980s, as with the
development of large-scale discount stores such as Walmart and Target in the United States.  The
ability of these stores to offer lower prices has depended on an extensive system of outsourcing to low-
wage countries, with new inventory methods and rapid communication allowing for design changes
that are frequently needed in apparel.  This illustrates that trade (through outsourcing) and technology
(through computerized communication and inventories) are complementary rather than competing
explanations for the changes in employment and wages in the import-competitive sectors.
Given the difficulties in obtaining accurate measures of outsourcing across industries, it is
perhaps not surprising that attempts to measure the impact of trade on the employment and wages of
skilled and unskilled workers have led to quite modest estimates.  At the same time, attempts to
directly measure the impact of information technology on employment and wages of skilled and
unskilled workers directly – as opposed to treating the technology variable as a residual – have also
found that this variable can explain only a fraction of the changes.
6  In this sense, technology and trade
are on equal footing as being only partial explanations for rising wage inequality.  In fact, the same
                                               
6. Feenstra and Hanson (1997) find that outsourcing accounts for 20 percent of the shift in relative
employment towards skilled (non-production) workers in U.S. manufacturing during 1979-1990.  In
comparison, the increased use of computers and other high-technology equipment accounted for 30
percent of that shift.  Using an alternative measure of computer investment, Autor, Katz and Krueger
(1997) find that computers may explain as much as 30 to 50 percent of the increase in the relative
demand for more-skilled workers since 1970, whereas outsourcing is insignificant.15
reason is often given for such findings. Trade, it is often pointed out, still represents a relatively small
fraction of GDP.   And as Robert Gordon (1996, p. 267) has argued: “[P]art of the reasons that
electronic computers have thus far failed to produce a TFP [total factor productivity] revolution is that
they still represent a very small fraction of the capital stock.”
Given that we cannot fully explain empirically the increase in wage inequality, it is important to
think conceptually about these issue.  There are a number of models that can be used to explore the
impact of globalization on wages. One approach, for example, is to consider how skilled and unskilled
labor are used in different intensities along “value chain” of a product, as in Feenstra and Hanson
(1996).  They find that outsourcing reduces the relative demand for unskilled labor, and this result
applies both to the more developed economy that is shedding production activities, and to the
developing economy that is receiving them.  The reason is that the outsourced activities are unskilled
labor-intensive relative to those done in the developed economy, but skilled-labor intensive relative to
those done in the less developed economy. Moving these activities from one country to the other raises
the average skill-intensity of production in both locations. 
Another approach is to bring location decisions and transportation costs in to the picture
explicitly. Markusen and Venables (1995, 1996a, b) allow multinational firm to choose their location of
production, in a setting with high and low skilled labor into each country. They also find that
multinationals can increase the skilled-unskilled wage gap in the high income country, and under some
circumstances, in the low income country as well.  Krugman and Venables (1995) analyze a model with
trade in intermediate goods subject to transport costs.  At medium levels of transport costs (low
enough to promote trade but high enough to prevent factor price equalization), a core-periphery
pattern emerges: countries in the core will have manufacturing agglomerated in them, while those in the16
periphery suffer from a lack of industry and low wages.  At lower levels of transport costs, the
agglomeration of manufacturing in the core areas disappears, leading to a fall in wage inequality across
regions.
7
Yet another approach is to combine trade with explicit consideration of the factor market
institutions in a country. For example, Davis (1996a, b, c) has considered the implications of
globalization in a model that contrasts the flexible wages of American with the fixed wages of Europe. 
It turns out that the impact of globalization  is very different than if wages are uniformly flexible; in
particular, the brunt of the new supplying countries is borne by European unemployment when those
wages are fixed, and does not affect American wages as would occur if both regions had flexible
wages.  For similar reasons, the impact of technological changes also depends on the prevailing factor
markets institutions in each country, which serves to emphasize that the impact of globalization cannot
be assessed independently of conditions in a country's trading partners.
Policy Issues
What should be the policy response, if any, to increased globalization and its impact on
unskilled workers?  To answer this, it is worthwhile to review the welfare criterion underlying any
response to import competition, and existing trade laws that appear to act on the basis of these
concerns.
At the heart of any policy action taken to protect individuals or firms from import competition
is, I believe, the sense that people should be protected from undue losses as a result of international
                                               
7. Matsuyama (1996) demonstrates a similar pattern of agglomeration and uneven incomes across
countries.  Gao (1998) has extended this type of model to allow for multinational firms, and found that
agglomeration breaks down more quickly (at higher levels of transport costs) due to these firms,
leading to more equal incomes across countries.17
trade.  A strong version of this criterion would be what Max Corden (1974) has called the
“conservative social welfare function,” in which income is redistributed so that no one loses from an
expansion of trade.  In this spirit, existing trade policies attempt to compensate those individuals who
have been harmed due to expansions or changes in the pattern of trade. This is not to say that all actors
involved in the formulation of trade laws have this exact interest in mind, but rather, that one outcome
of the bargaining process over trade laws is that something like the “conservative social welfare
function” becomes an objective. (The question of whether there exists a more efficient set of
instruments to achieve this objective will be taken up in the next section).
An example of this criterion in existing trade law is the so-called “escape clause” provision, or
Section 201 of U.S. trade law, which mirrors Article XIX of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT).  The original purpose of Article XIX and Section 201 was to offer protection for a
limited period of time to industries and workers who faced import competition due to the multilateral
reduction of tariffs under GATT.  Later, the criterion to receive protection under Section 201 U.S. law
was loosened to cover any industries facing an increase in imports, whether these were due to tariff
reductions or not.  Another example consistent with the “conservative social welfare function” is trade
adjustment assistance, which offers special compensation to workers who are laid off due to import
competition. 
It is worth asking why workers and firms in trade-impact industries receive special
compensation, while individuals experiencing economic hardship for other reasons do not.  The answer
is that both trade adjustment assistance and the “escape clause” provision are payoffs that make trade
liberalization politically feasible.  In contrast, a worker laid-off due to tight monetary policy is not
entitled to special compensation beyond the usual unemployment insurance.  It is difficult for18
economists to see the difference between workers in these two cases, but it is built into our institutions:
the Federal Reserve Bank has the right to tighten monetary policy, regardless of the consequences,
whereas foreign countries do not have the right to sell products abroad with first negotiating this
access, as done under the GATT and WTO.  The sovereignty of nations, combined with shared
authority for trade policy within a nation, implies that economic hardship due to trade liberalization will
be treated differently from hardship due to changing domestic conditions.
In view of the increased integration of the global economy, it may be that the “escape clause”
provision should be strengthened to obtain better coverage of individuals affected, as has been
proposed by Rodrik (1997).  But the concern for the change in income of domestic factors is not new,
and the magnitude of potential losses for unskilled labor in industrial countries – where these losses are
due to increased trade and outsourcing – is perhaps no greater now than has occurred in earlier rounds
of trade liberalization under GATT.  What does seem new in the current debate is the concern for the
workers in foreign countries, either in regard to their conditions of work or their right to organize.  An
example is the Labor Side Agreement negotiated under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and ratified by the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  Can provisions such as this be
justified in welfare terms?
8
 By considering only the well-being of domestic agents, the “conservative social welfare
function” is actually a very narrow concept.  Clearly, it makes sense to include the well-being of agents
in other countries within any welfare criterion.  But the concerns being expressed for foreign workers
are slightly unusual in that they do not necessarily focus on the poorest workers abroad.  Furthermore,
the concerns expressed for foreign workers do not focus on those workers facing a drop in income due
                                               
8.  The political economy factors leading to support for international labor standards are examined
empirically by Krueger (1996).19
to trade. For example, a foreign worker facing health hazards in a plant producing export products may
be better off than if she did not have that job. Indeed, the “voluntary” nature of the employment
relation is sometimes used as a justification for avoiding intervention.  But this is surely incorrect!  The
fact that a worker would “voluntarily” continue in a job that exposed her to health hazards attests to
her dismal alternative opportunities, and the complete absence of any bargaining power compared to
the firm.  This is precisely the situation where some institution (be it the government or a union) that
can represent the interests of workers is called for.
The question, then, is whether trade policy has any role to play in protecting the interests of
foreign labor.  A number examples of this already exist.  Even prior to NAFTA, several U.S. trade laws
give the Executive Branch the power to withhold trade privileges from countries that do not give their
workers basic rights, including the right to organize.  These include the 1983 Caribbean Basin
Initiative, the 1984 Amendments to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and the Omnibus
Trade Act of 1988 (Stone, 1996, p. 469).  Such provisions have occasionally been used, as in 1987
when President Reagan denied GSP preferences to Nicaragua, Paraguay and Romania on the basis of
their alleged violations of labor rights.  While these powers exist for the Executive Branch, there are
two problems with their use.  First, denying preferences to a foreign country across all industries is a
very broad foreign policy action, and would usually be decided on that basis.  These laws are too
sweeping to allow particular companies to be sanctioned.  Second, these laws involve a comparison of
U.S. labor standards with those found abroad, and the decision that the foreign practices are
inadequate.  This is a difficult and value-laden judgement, since it involves imposing the preferences of
one country on another.  Considerations of national sovereignty suggest that countries are largely20
entitled to choose their own domestic policies, even when they conflict with established norms abroad.
9
There are examples of other trade laws, however, that do not impinge on national sovereignty
and are designed to protect workers in foreign countries: the Labor Side Agreement negotiated under
NAFTA is a case in point.  This agreement does not change the existing labor laws in these countries,
but it meant to improve the enforcement of laws dealing with occupational health and safety, child
labor, and minimum wages.  If one country believes that another is failing to enforce its own laws in
these areas, then a complaint can be brought before the North American Commission for Labor
Cooperation, which includes representatives from each country, and that attempts to resolve the
dispute through consultation and cooperation.  Critics of this agreement have argued that the
procedures for resolving disputes are slow, and include major exceptions that render them ineffective. 
Stone (1996, p. 463), for instance, argues that the Side Agreement contains “exceptions [that] provide
a legal excuse for almost all nonenforcement.  In fact, in light of these broad exceptions, it is difficult to
imagine any situation in which the Side Agreement's procedures for obtaining labour law enforcement
would apply.”  Others argue that the agreement has created an institutional forum in which unions and
labor activists from the three countries can build solidarity, and that even the review of cases leads firms
to modify their practices  (Compa, 1997a).
10
What accounts for the relatively weak provisions of the Labor Side Agreement, at least as
                                               
9. An important example here is child labor, which is avoided in industrial countries, but may be
necessary for families in developing countries.  T.N. Srinivasan (1995) has argued that imposing the
norms of industrial countries, especially via trade sanctions, would be a mistake.  
10.  From 1994-1997, there were six cases treated under the Labor Side Agreement, five in
Mexico and one in the U.S., all involving union rights.  Union activities are covered by the first
(or lowest) of three tiers of treatment under the Agreement, which means that the cases are
restricted to a fact-finding review process, with optional ministerial consultations (Compa,
1997a). There is now a case being considered at the second tier of treatment, involving alleged
pregnancy discrimination among actual or prospective female workers in the maquiladora sector21
compared to import policies such as the “escape clause”?  One part of the answer is that these
provisions place domestic labor and business in an adversarial position.  Without capital mobility,
domestic workers and firms would both want greater enforcement of labor standards abroad, so as to
lessen import competition.  This is similar to the common front that labor and capital often take in
Section 201 protection, with unions and firms in an industry both appearing before the U.S.
International Trade Commission to argue for tariff protection.  But with rapid capital mobility (through
either direct investment or outsourcing), firms can move abroad to take advantage of lower wages and
regulatory burdens, so they would not want to have regulations enforced more strictly.  This means
that globalization and rapid capital mobility has changed the bargaining positions of labor and capital. 
The position of capital has been strengthened in that it can seek opportunities abroad, while labor has
been placed in a weakened position.  Some preliminary evidence on this is provided by Slaughter
(1997), who finds that globalization has increased the elasticity of labor demand in some manufacturing
industries.
The impact of globalization on changing the bargaining position of labor and capital has far-
reaching consequences.  The decline in union power within trade-impacted industries may well account
for a portion of the increased wage inequality in the United States (Borjas and Ramey, 1995).
 11  The
after-tax earnings of workers are also affected by government policy, and Rodrik (1997) shows that
taxation within the OECD countries has been shifting away from capital and towards labor.  Such an
outcome is efficient, since the deadweight losses from taxing mobile capital are high, but it has
distributional effects that cannot be ignored.  While the ability to raise revenue from capital taxation has
                                                                                                                                                      
of Mexico (Compa, 1997b).
11.  Some contrary evidence is provided by Blanchflower (1997), however, who finds that the
wage gap created by union pressure has remained roughly constant in both the U.S. and Great
Britain, even while there has been a decline in union membership in both countries.22
been reduced, the need to raise revenue to offset external risks created by international competition has
increased.  This is the fundamental policy dilemma that Rodrik identifies.
Efficiency and Equity
The world has become increasingly integrated through trade in the last several decades, and the
structure of trade has shifted towards more outsourcing, or vertical specialization.  I have suggested
that to understand the implications of this change, we need to use a conceptual framework where firms
allocate their production activities worldwide.  While many details of this framework remain to be
worked out, in this section, I would like to speculate on the type of results that it might yield.
First, the globalization of production should bring with it gains from trade that are likely to be
substantial.  Over and above the traditional gains from increased specialization and exchange across
countries, trade in intermediate inputs brings efficiency gains that amount to an outward shift in the
production frontier for final goods in each country.  This was emphasized by Ethier (1982), who
discussed international returns to scale due to increased variety and trade in differentiated intermediate
inputs.
12  While Ethier’s model is static, it is often credited with containing the key insights of the
“endogenous growth” literature, under which productivity grows due to increased variety (or quality)
of inputs.  The same productivity gains discussed in this literature apply when firms shift their
production activities across countries.
However, we must ask whether these efficiency gains bring costs in terms of the distribution of
income.  One way to phrase this questions is to consider whether outsourcing makes factor-price
equalization more or less likely.  Evidence from the integration of countries through trade strongly
                                               
12.  Sanyal and Jones (1982) developed a model of trade in intermediate inputs at about the same
time, but did not focus on the issue of returns to scale.23
supports the idea that factor prices move towards equality (Ben-David, 1993, 1996; and see
Williamson’s contribution in this issue).  If we also allow firms to spread their production process
across countries, would this accelerate or offset the movement towards factor-price equalization?
To answer this, start with two countries having quite different factor endowments.  Suppose
that they are different enough so that trade in final goods is not able to equalize factor prices.  Now
allow firms in each country to break up their production process, and pursue activities in the other
country.  Activities that are intensive in unskilled-labor would be performed in the country abundant in
that factor.  Effectively, this is the same as allowing firms to import a certain amount of primary factors
from the other country, and combine it with their home production.  The result of this outsourcing
activity on factor prices would therefore be the same as the movement of factor between countries: it
would move factor price towards greater equality.  From the perspective of the scarce factor in each
country (unskilled labor in the U.S.), this means that their wages would be lowered by outsourcing,
over and above the impact of trade in final goods.  In this sense, the decision of companies to spread
production across countries has distributional consequences that cannot be ignored.  The position of
low-skilled workers in the industrial countries is worsened by the complementary combination of
globalization and new technology.
This raises the question of whether it is possible to redistribute income towards low-skilled
workers, and by what policy instrument.  We know surprisingly little about redistribution schemes,
other than that they often fail.  The common problem is that obtaining the necessary information on
who to compensate, and by how much, creates severe disincentives.  But one suggestion has been
made in several quite different contexts, albeit in somewhat different forms, and is worth repeating
here. Dixit and Norman (1986) have shown that a system of tax and subsidies on all goods and factors,24
combined with a poll subsidy, can be used to obtain Pareto gains from trade, without requiring a
mechanism for revelation of private information.  Exactly this type of proposal was made in the context
of German unification by Akerlof et al. (1991), who argued that a wage subsidy to workers in East
Germany would prevent them from experiencing losses, and would be pay for itself through savings in
unemployment insurance.  More recently, Phelps (1996) has argued eloquently that a wage subsidy
directed at the lowest paid workers ought to be considered in the United States.  The scheme he
proposes has a budgetary cost of about $125 billion in 1997, but he suggests that much of this would
be recouped through increased tax revenues and reduced social expenditures as employment rose.  It is
striking that such similar proposals have been made in these different contexts.  If we want to move
beyond the possibility of Pareto gains to making actual compensation, it appears that we could do no
better than wage subsidies to low-skilled workers.25
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Table 1:  Ratios of Merchandise Trade to GDP (Percent)
Country                   1890          1913          1960          1970          1980          1990
Australia 15.7 21.0 13.0 11.5 13.6 13.4
Canada 12.8 17.0 14.5 18.0 24.1 22.0
Denmark 24.0 30.7 26.9 23.3 26.8 24.3
France 14.2 15.5 9.9 11.9 16.7 17.1
Germany 15.9 19.9 14.5 16.5 21.6 24.0
Italy 9.7 14.4 10.0 12.8 19.3 15.9
Japan
a 5.1 12.5 8.8 8.3 11.8 8.4
Norway 21.8 25.5 24.9 27.6 30.8 28.8
Sweden 23.6 21.2 18.8 19.7 25.0 23.5
United Kingdom 27.3 29.8 15.3 16.5 20.3 20.6
United States
b 5.6 6.1 3.4 4.1 8.8 8.0
                                                                                                                                      
Notes:
Merchandise trade is measured as the average of imports and exports, expect as noted below. 
a.  Data for 1890-1950 uses three-year averages.
b.  Data recorded under 1890 is for 1889, and along with that in 1913, measures the ratio of
merchandise exports to GNP.
Sources:
1960-1990:  Data for the United States are taken from Economic Report of the President, 1997,
Tables B-10 and B-101; data for other countries are calculated from World Tables of Economic
and Social Indicators, 1950-1992, The World Bank, 1993.
1890-1913:  Data for the United States from Irwin (1996, Table 1); data for Japan from Bairoch
and Kozul-Wright (1996); data for other countries from Williamson (1996, Table 1).34
Table 2:  Ratios of Merchandise Trade to Industry Value-Added (Percent)
Country                   1890          1913         1960
a
         1970          1980         1990
b
Australia 27.2 35.6 24.4 25.6 32.4 38.7
Canada 29.7 39.4 37.6 50.5 65.6 69.8
Denmark 47.4 66.2 60.2 65.9 90.0 85.9
France 18.5 23.3 16.8 25.7 44.0 53.5
Germany 22.7 29.2 24.6 31.3 48.5 57.8
Italy 14.4 21.9 19.2 26.0 43.1 43.9
Japan 10.2 23.9 15.3 15.7 25.8 18.9
Norway 46.2 55.2 60.0 73.2 70.9 74.8
Sweden 42.5 37.5 39.7 48.8 72.9 73.1
United Kingdom 61.5 76.3 33.8 40.7 52.6 62.8
United States
c 14.3 13.2 9.6 13.7 30.9 35.8
                                                                                                                                   
Notes:
Merchandise trade is measured as the average of imports and exports, expect as noted below. 
Industry value-added combines agriculture, mining and manufacturing for the U.S., and these
sectors plus construction and public utilities for most other countries.
a.  Value for Australia refers to 1962, and for Canada refers to 1961.
b.  Value for Canada refers to 1988, for Germany to 1989, and for the U.K. to 1987.
c.  Data recorded under 1890 is for 1889, and along with that in 1913, measures the ratio of
merchandise exports to industry value-added.
Sources:
1960-1990:  Data for the United States are taken from Economic Report of the President, 1997,
Tables B-10 and B-101; data for other countries are calculated from World Tables of Economic
and Social Indicators, 1950-1992, The World Bank, 1993, except as noted below.
1890-1913:  Data for the United States from Irwin (1996, Table 1).  Data for other countries are
computed from Table 1, making use of the proportion of national income accounted for by
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, construction and public utilities from Mitchell (1992, 1993,
1995).  These values are also used in computing the trade ratios for Denmark and Italy in 1960,
and for France and Sweden in 1960 and 1970.  For Canada, the industry share of GDP in 1890
and 1913 is assumed to equal that in 1926-29, the earliest years for which data is available.35
Table 3:  Shares of U.S. Exports and Imports by End-Use Categories (Percent)
Category                                                1925          1950          1965          1980          1995
Foods, feeds and  Imports 21.9 30.0 19.1 11.3 5.0
beverages Exports 18.7 15.5 19.2 16.9 9.2
Industrial supplies  Imports 68.2 62.4 53.3 31.3 18.2
and materials Exports 59.8 45.5 34.8 32.2 25.6
Capital goods  Imports 0.4 1.3 7.1 19.0 33.6
(except autos) Exports 8.7 22.4 31.4 35.0 42.4
Consumer goods Imports 9.4 6.1 16.0 21.5 24.3
(except autos)  Exports 6.0 8.9 7.0 7.8 11.7
Automotive vehicles  Imports 0.02 0.3 4.5 16.9 18.9
and parts Exports 6.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 11.2
                                                                                                                                              
Sources:
1990 and 1980 from the December issue of the Survey of Current Business for 1992 and 1982,
Table 4.3; 1970 from The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-
1976, Statistical Tables, Department of Commerce, September 1981, Table 4.3; 1925-1960 from
U.S. Exports and Import Classified by OBE End-Use Commodity Categories, 1923-1968,
Supplement to the Survey of Current Business, Department of Commerce, November 1970,
Tables 1 and 2.36
Table 4:  Ratio of Imported to Domestic Intermediate Inputs
- Textiles, Apparel and Footwear (Percent)
Country                         Early 1970s                Mid/late 1970s               Mid-1980s
Canada 41 50 60
France 15 26 42
Germany na 49 64
Japan 3 6 9
United Kingdom 19 33 48
United States 7 6 13
                                                                                                                             
Source:  Audet (1996, Table 8.18).37
Table 5:  Share of Imported to Total Intermediate Inputs (Percent)
Country                              1974                           1984                           1993
All Manufacturing Industries
Canada 15.9 14.4 20.2
Japan 8.2 7.3 4.1
United Kingdom 13.4 19.0 21.6
United States 4.1 6.2 8.2
Chemical and Allied Products
Canada 9.0 8.8 15.1
Japan 5.2 4.8 2.6
United Kingdom 13.1 20.6 22.5
United States 3.0 4.5 6.3
Industrial Machinery (Non-electrical)
Canada 17.7 21.9 26.6
Japan 2.1 1.9 1.8
United Kingdom 16.1 24.9 31.3
United States 4.1 7.2 11.0
Electrical Equipment and Machinery
Canada 13.2 17.1 30.9
Japan 3.1 3.4 2.9
United Kingdom 14.9 23.6 34.6
United States 4.5 6.7 11.6
Transportation Equipment
Canada 29.1 37.0 49.7
Japan 1.8 2.4 2.8
United Kingdom 14.3 25.0 32.2
United States 6.4 10.7 15.7
                                                                                                                             
Notes:  U.S. estimates are for 1975, 1985, and 1995.
Source:  Campa and Goldberg (1997, Tables 1,3,5,7).